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An Analysis of Iran-Iraq Bilateral Border Treaties
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 1980, Iraqi ground forces crossed the border into
Iran, marking the official commencement of the Iran-Iraq war.' The
war culminated a long history of tense relations between Iraq and Iran
with the disputes traceable for thousands of years.2 Never before had
past tensions escalated into the level of fierce fighting that would charac-
terize the next eight years of war. One of the primary reasons for such
long standing and successful armed conflict minimilization was the abil-
ity of the two countries to reach agreements in the form of treaties.'
Although many of these treaties were short-lived, the overall treaty rela-
tions between the two countries provide an excellent opportunity to ex-
amine the strength and weaknesses of bilateral treaties along with the
dynamics involved with a commitment to treaty formulation. The 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Law of Treaties"), the codi-
fied summation of the international law on treaties, merits particular at-
tention. An examination of the historical relations between Iran and
Iraq, focusing on the treaty development between the two States, is the
basis for this analysis. In particular, claims as to which State consented,
terminated, or violated the various treaties is analyzed, comparing each
1 This date is listed as the official start of the war by most sources because of Iraq's direct
invasion of Iranian territory "at 2 o'clock [Iranian time] on the afternoon of September 22, 1980."
H. FARIDANI, THE IMPOSED WAR 9 (1983); see also J.M. ABDULGHANI, IRAQ & IRAN: THE YEAR
OF CRISIS 204 (1984).
2 In the early days of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, told his people
that the war had roots dating back to AD 637 when Iraq, then a part of the Sassanian empire, ended
a long reign of oppressive Persian rule at the battle of Qadisiya, located on one of the canals on the
Euphrates River. It All Goes Back to AD 637, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1980 at 41. See also
Geoffrey Godsell, Behind Iran-Iraq Clash: Battle to Control Gulf, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 15, 1980, at 1; A.O. Sulzberger Jr., Roots of War in the Gulf: Mesopotamia and Persia, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1980, at A10.
3 The word treaty is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Law
of Treaties] as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments
and whatever its particular designation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(a), 8 I.L.M. 679, 681. The phrase "whatever particular designation"
is used to cover all other terms that carry the same meaning in international law as the word 'treaty'
such as, "conventions, protocols, pacts, acts, statutes, charters, covenants, concordats, declarations,
agreements, and modi vivendi." T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 13-14 (1974).
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State's use of international legal principles as expressed in the Law of
Treaties.
II. THE HISTORY OF IRAN-IRAQ TREATY LAW
A. The Early Years: The Ottoman Empire Versus Persia
Iraq did not gain independence until the Treaty of Lausanne of
1923,1 although Iraq continued under the tutelage of Great Britain until
the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930. In the years preceding its independence,
Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks had been
unsuccessful in expanding their power westward and thus turned east
starting in the 16th century, managing to seize Basra, but stopping short
of Persia.'
The Persian7 Empire was formed in the sixth century B.C. by King
Cyrus.' Before the Ottoman Empire came into the Middle East region
nearly 2000 years later, Persia had fought many battles trying to both
expand its power and to defend itself. Regardless of the outcome of those
battles, Persia always maintained a national identity with its own lan-
guage, traditions, and culture of Indo-European decent.9 The Persian
religion of Zoroastrianism, however, did not survive. The defeat of Per-
sia by Arab forces at Qadisiyah in 637 A.D.10 resulted in a flourishing of
Islam and the gradual banishment of Zoroastrianism throughout the
Middle East, including Persia."1
When the Ottoman Empire established itself as the major power in
4 Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11; see also EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE
GULF WAR 5 (1988).
5 Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, June 30, 1930, Great Britain-Northern Ireland-Iraq, 132 L.N.T.S.
363. At the end of WWI, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate territory which was to be
administered by Britain. The running of the Iraqi government by Britain continued until the signing
of the Anglo-Treaty in June 1930. This treaty paved the way for Iraq's admittance into the League
of Nations in 1932, while insuring that the large British influence in the area would continue. IRAQ;
A COUNTRY STUDY 32, 39 (Helen C. Metz ed. 1990); MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR 31
(1988).
6 0'BALLANcE, supra note 4, at 2.
7 "In 1935, Reza Shah decreed that his country's name should be changed to 'Iran,' meaning
loosely 'Homeland of the Arayans."' Ia at 7.
8 DAVID E. LONG, Islamic Republic of Iran, in THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE
MIDDLE EAsT AND NORTH AMERICA 60 (1986); O'BALLANcE, supra note 4, at 2.
9 Id. at 2; Sulzberger, supra note 2, at A10.
10 See supra note 2, and accompanying text.
1 The spread of Islam did not immediately follow. Not until the sixteenth century did Islam
became widespread in Persia. When Islam did reach Persia, it was not the main branch of Islam, the
Sunni branch which is predominant in the Middle East, but rather the Shiite division, a heterodox
division of Islam. Today, Iran is controlled by the Shiite Muslims while Iraq is ruled by Sunni
Muslims, even though slightly more than half of Iraq is Shiite. KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 6-11;
Sulzberger, supra note 2, at A10; Godsell, supra note 2, at I; IRAQ; A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
5, at xiv.
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the area, tensions between the two States immediately began to rise. The
two Empires adopted opposing branches of the Islamic faith, while con-
tinually engaging in frequent but relatively mild skirmishes along an un-
defined border.12
Two main areas formed the basis of the territorial disputes between
the States. The first area of dispute is the river known as the Shatt al-
Arab.13 This area has always been extremely valuable to Iraq, Iran, and
their predecessors. For the Ottoman Empire and Persia, the Shatt al-
Arab always represented the extent of their territorial reach.14 Today,
both Iraq and Iran have very strategic and important ports along the
Shatt al-Arab. 5 For Iraq, the Shatt al-Arab represents its only true out-
let to the Persian Gulf. The Shatt al-Arab has been referred to as "a vital
artery of communications for Iraq." 6 Iraq's very limited direct access to
the Gulf through its short coast line, along with the fact that virtually all
of its major ports are on the Shatt al-Arab,17 account for Iraq's extreme
sensitivity concerning the use of the Shatt al-Arab.18 Iran, on the other
hand, has a very long coast line along the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, it
too has its most significant oil refinery on the Shatt al-Arab and has long
depended on the Shatt al-Arab to help foster its trade.19
The second area of contention has been the lands north of the Shatt
al-Arab which separates the two countries.20 This area is largely inhab-
12 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 11.
13 Shatt al-Arab, meaning "Shore of the Arabs" is the name given to the confluence of the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers before they disgorge into the Persian Gulf. Sayed Hassan Amin, The
Iran-Iraq Conflict: Legal Implications, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 167, 169 (1982).
14 Harold Ticktin, Persians and Arabs Divided by Same Waterway for Millenniums, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, at E22.
15 These major port cities include Khorramshar in Iran and Basra in Iraq. SAYED HASSAN
AMIN, PoLITICAL AND STRATEGIc ISSUES IN THE PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF 55 (1984) [hereinafter
PEsXAN-ARABiAN GULF].
16 Id. at 56-57. This is in large part due to the emergence of oil as a strategic resource. When
Britain entered the area following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, it immediately began con-
structing high volume ports in both Iran and Iraq to help Britain access the large oil fields located
along the Shatt al-Arab's banks.
17 The Shatt al-Arab not only provides Iraq with its only access to the sea, it is also the source
of Iraq's large fishing industry. PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 55, 62, 70; E. Lauter-
pacht, River Boundarie" Legal Aspects of the Shatt-al-Arab Frontier, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 208,
226 (1960) [hereinafter River.Boundaries].
18 This point was made clear by the Iraqi representative Noury Pasha Said in his address to the
League of Nations in 1935 when he stated, "[tihe Shatt-al-Arab... constitutes Iraq's only access to
the sea; ... and Basra, 100 kilometres from the mouth, is Iraq's only port." 16 LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS OJ. 113 (1935) [hereinafter League of Nations].
19 It should be noted that Iran has, in recent years, reduced its dependence on the Shatt al-
Arab. ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 120. Nevertheless, the Shatt al-Arab still provides Iran with a
valuable outlet to the sea for its Khuzistan oil fields and for its industry on the island of Abadan both
located on the Shatt al-Arab. PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 55, 62.
20 PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 54.
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ited by Kurds, who have long been opposed to Iraqi control.21 Over the
first two hundred years of the Otto-Persian existence, this area was never
given a definitive border. Thus, desire for control over this northern area
was the main impetus behind the early conflicts between the Ottoman
Empire and Persia. In response to these conflicts the two countries, since
1639, began a long series of treaty formations, violations and
abrogations.22
Before the Ottoman Empire and Persia could even begin to establish
their common border, a cessation of hostilities was first needed. There-
fore, the first series of treaties between the two were basically
armistices.23
Although the first formal treaty, the Treaty of Zohab of 1639,24 laid
down a very general border which simply "made a broad division be-
tween the Persian plateau and the Mesopotamian plain,"2 the Treaty
was nonetheless referred to as a sulh .26 This type of treaty was written
under Islamic principles, and was not to have a binding affect of more
than ten years.27 However, the two States did not sign another agree-
ment until the Treaty of Kurda in 1746,28 which reaffirmed the borders
laid out in the Treaty of Zohab.2 9 Once again, this Treaty was not one
that was meant to last, and it soon became necessary to draw up yet
another treaty.
The next treaty in this succession was the Treaty of Erzerum in
1823.30 This Treaty reaffirmed the basic ideas set forth in two previous
treaties while also ending the war of 1821-23 between the Ottomans and
the Persians." In addition, the Treaty added two new aspects to the
border relationship. First, the Treaty established border zones instead of
the past frontier lines.32 Second, the Treaty referred back to the Treaty
of Kurda's principles of reconciliation and normalization of relationships
between the Ottoman Empire and Persia. At the same time, the Treaty
21 IRAQ; A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 5, at 84.
22 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 33.
23 Id.
24 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 2.
25 Id.
26 Sulh is defined as a truce. KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 33.
27 "Indeed, neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Persian Shah intended that the treaty con-
cluded between them last too long, since both were anxious to resume fighting at the earliest possible
moment in order to reestablish the unity of the house of Islam under one supreme authority." Id.
28 Treaty of Peace between Persia and Turkey, 1746, Persia-Turkey, 37 PARRY's T.S. 441.
29 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 2.
30 Treaty of Erzerum, July 28, 1823, Persia-Turkey, 73 PARRY'S T.S. 283.
31 MALCOLM E. YAPP, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN NEAR EAST 1792-1923, 127 (1987).
32 The idea of a "zone" instead of a distinct border line was developed to allow the tribes that
occupied the area separating the countries to decide for themselves to which State they would ad-
here. Thus, the allegiances of the nomadic tribes in the border zone determined the limits of each
State's control. KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 33.
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of Erzerum, laid down the foundations for the Second Treaty of Erzerum
of 1847. 33
The main reason for a second treaty was that the first had essentially
disintegrated. One year after the first treaty was signed, Persia backed a
Kurdish rebellion in northeastern Iraq.' Fourteen years after the first
Treaty of Erzerum had been signed, the forces of the two States again
engaged in light fighting.35 This time, the Ottoman troops attacked the
Persian port city of Muhammara, located on the Shatt al-Arab.36 Both
of these acts constituted open and direct violations of the Treaty of Erze-
rum, which had been a peace treaty and not a simple truce.37 These
breaches of the Treaty made it clear that yet another treaty, one which
better defined the Persian-Ottoman border, was needed.
The need for a new treaty was so great that the Russian and British
governments, both of which had great stakes in the Middle East, became
actively involved in the formation of the second treaty.38 The second
Treaty of Erzerum39 began by reaffirming the earlier agreements that had
been signed as to the intentions for peace and normalization of relations.
The Treaty then went on to detail precisely what was meant by those
words and to further define the border between the two States. The
Treaty declared that the southern part of the Shatt al-Arab would be the
starting point for the border between the two States.' In so doing, the
eastern bank of the Shatt al-Arab was to be Persian, while the Ottomans
were given full sovereignty over the areas lying on the west bank.41 One
33 Treaty of Limits between Persia and Turkey, May 1847, Persia-Turkey, 101 Parry's T.S. 85
[hereinafter Second Treaty]; see also O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 4.
34 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 6.
35 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 35.
36 Id; see also ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 6.
37 Treaty of Erzerum, supra note 30, at 288; KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 35; see also supra
notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
38 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 35. The Russian and British governments acted as the official
mediators during the formation of the treaty, even though their interests were slighted in favor of
Persia. TAREQ Y. ISMAEL, IRAQ AND IRAN: RoOrS OF CONFLICT 6 (1982).
39 Second Treaty, supra note 33. For an English Translation see 16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J.
197 (1935); ISMAEI, supra note 38, at 41.
40 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 4.
41 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 7. The Treaty did not clearly specify who had sovereignty
over the actual river. The Ottoman Empire. therefore, refused to sign the Treaty until it had assur-
ances to such a claim. IsMAEL, supra note 38, at 6. This concern was resolved by an Explanatory
Note, issued by the British and Russian governments. This Note asked that the Persian government
cede any and all possible claims to sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab itself. The Persian govern-
ment, represented by Mohammad Ali, approved and signed the Note. Id. at 45, 47. However, the
Persian government later denied that its representative possessed the power to bind Persia to the
terms of the Note stating, more than a century later:
When he arrived at Istanbul the Russian and British representatives requested him to sign,
over and above the exchange of instruments of approval, a note containing an interpreta-
tion of the articles of the Treaty which were in favor of the Ottoman government. The
19921
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of the key provisions of the Treaty was that it granted Persian vessels free
navigation of the Shattal-Arab waterway,42 thereby implying that the Ot-
tomans had complete control over the Shatt al-Arab in the first place.43
This implication was affirmed in an Explanatory Note issued by the Brit-
ish and Russian governments.'
The second Treaty of Ezerum also set out to establish more clearly
the northern part of the Ottoman-Persian border. To do this, the Treaty
provided that a commission be appointed whose task it would be to de-
marcate the northern border.4" Once again, however, the two sides were
soon in conflict. This time the dispute was not with arms, but rather on
the interpretation of some of the Treaty's key provisions. For example,
the nomadic tribes which traveled between the two, as well as those
tribes that were spread across the border, especially around the Shatt al-
Arab, were a constant source of friction between the two States for pur-
poses such as military conscription." Other disputes arose as the demar-
cation commission found itself in a constant argument over where
exactly to mark the frontier.47 The two sides did manage to agree in
1869 that the status quo should be preserved4" in defining the boundary,
but the vague frontiers established in the previous treaties did not make
the commission's task any easier. These debates were so frequent and
Government of Iran had not the slightest information on the text of the interpretation, and
the said Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan, trusting in the influence of the Russians and the
British upon the Iranian Court of that time, signed it on his own initiative and without any
authority to do so.
Id. at 8.
42 Second Treaty, supra note 30, art. II at 87; KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 35; O'BALLANCE,
supra note 4, at 4.
43 River Boundaries, supra note 17, at 210.
44 The Note stated:
The undersign Representatives [Persia and the Ottoman Empire] further declare that Per-
sia will not be entitled on any pretext whatsoever to put forward claims in regard to the
regions situated on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, or to the territory on the left bank
belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or parts of such tribes are established on
the said bank or in the said territory.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 231-233. But see ABDULGHANI, supra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
45 Second Treaty, supra note 33, art. III at 86. This provision, however, was not very accurate.
It simply stated that the two Contracting Parties would appoint commissioners to determine the
frontier without going into any further detail as to the length of office, their authority or how many
were to be named. Id.
46 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 7. Article VIII was supposed to deal with this question but
it only stated that the two parties would choose which tribe went to whom without laying any
foundation for how such a decision would or should be made. Second Treaty, supra note 33, art.
VIII at 88.
47 This was mainly due to the fact that the Treaty did not specify how the commission should
be run. Second Treaty, supra note 33, art. III at 87.
48 Provisional Arrangement between Persia and Turkey for Frontier Delimitation, Aug. 2,
1969, Persia-Turkey, art. II, 139 Parry's T.S. 425, at 426; see also ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 7.
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unending that by the time World War I commenced in 1914, the com-
mission still had not finished its task.49
The Tehran Protocol in 1911,50 the Constantinople Protocol in
1913,51 and the Delimitation Commission's agreement in 1914,52 how-
ever, did help to clarify the territorial limits, which had been roughly laid
out in the second Treaty of Erzerum. The Teheran Protocol was created
so that disputes regarding the demarcation process would be submitted
to an arbitration tribunal at the Hague.53
The Constantinople Protocol had a much greater impact. First and
foremost, "the protocol reasserted the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty
over the entire Shatt al-Arab up to the Persian side."54 Additionally, the
Protocol marked the first time that the concept of the "thalweg"55 was
introduced into the border negotiations between the two countries.
Although the Protocol limited the use of this concept to very specific
waterways around islands that were given to Persia, its significance can-
not be understated in the formation of later treaties and agreements. In
the end, the Protocol marked the last significant compromise reached by
the Ottomans and Persians before the outbreak of World War I.
B. The Emergence of Iraq and the Corresponding Need for More
Agreements
World War I marked a dramatic change in the balance of power in
49 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 36-7.
50 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 234.
51 Id. at 227.
52 Id. at 235.
53 The Teheran Protocol specifically states:
Should the delegates of the two Parties fail to agree on the interpretation and application of
certain clauses of [the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847], it is agreed that, at the end of a period
of six months of negotiation, in order completely to settle the question of the delimitation
of the frontiers, all the points on which any divergence exists shall be submitted together to
the Hague Court of Arbitration, in order that the entire question may thus be definitely
settled.
Id. art. 4, at 234.
54 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 111. The Constantinople Protocol states, "From this point
the frontier shall follow the course of the Shatt-al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman
sovereignty the river and all the islands therein ... LEAGUE OF NATIONS supra note 18, at 230,
see also O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 4-5.
55 "Thalweg" is defined as "the middle of the deepest or most navigable channel" and usually
refers to water boundaries, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. 1990), such as the Shatt al-
Arab.
It is usual, where a navigable river forms an international boundary, for the thalweg to
constitute the dividing line, but this is by no means a universal rule. The boundary can be,
and sometimes is, fixed at the bank by agreement, and when this is the case, the agreement
is incontestably valid.
Former Iraqi Foreign Minister, Nuni al-Sa'id, quoted in ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 114.
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the Middle East. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the crea-
tion of a number of new independent states in the region. The treaties
which created an independent Iraq were the Treaty of S6vres of 192056
(never ratified by Turkey)57 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923,58 which
not only confirmed the establishment of Iraq in 1920, but also further
established Iraq's borders.59 The eastern border of Iraq was to be exactly
that which the Ottoman Empire had held before.' As successor to the
Ottoman Empire's territorial rights in the area, Iraq also inherited and
became bound by the previous agreements between the Ottoman Empire
and Persia.61 This pleased neither Iraq nor Persia.
As a new state, Iraq had to rely on other States to establish its terri-
torial borders and to help as it struggled to create its first independent
government. The main foreign power to provide such help was the
United Kingdom. The U.K. had begun to establish itself as a major force
in the area long before World War I, but immediately after World War I
its role became even greater.62 The U.K.'s interest in the Middle East,
however, was not universally well received. Iraq depended on the U.K.
to help Iraq secure its borders, since Iraq needed time to organize an
effective army. At the same time, the U.K. wanted both to secure unlim-
ited access to the Shatt al-Arab as well as to maintain friendly relations
with Persia whose importance in the Middle East had grown with the
defeat of the Ottomans and the discovery of oil in the region. The result
was that Iraq was upset that it did not get even greater rights of control
over the Shatt al-Arab.63 Persia, on the other hand, demanded a redraw-
ing of the lines between the two countries, especially in the area of the
56 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 5.
57 After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Empire not only lost a great
deal of territory, but also renamed itself Turkey.
58 Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4.
59 Id. art. 3(2).
60 Id. art. 3.
61 Iraq inherited and became bound by the previous treaties based on the international princi-
ple of State succession, which recognizes that when two parties sign a treaty it is the State itself that
is being bound, not any particular government which happens to be representing the State at the
time. This assumes, however, that the government is the legitimate government at the time it acts to
bind the State to a given treaty. See The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of
Treaties, 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978).
62 After WWI, France and the U.K. divided up the remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire,
with the U.K. gaining control over Iraq. ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 14. The U.K. retained its
dominating control over Iraq until the Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 4. In Persia, the U.K.
stepped up its influence by signing an agreement with the Shah of Persia in 1919, which included the
reform of Persian soldiers by British officers and the sale of arms to Persia. ISMAEL, supra note 38,
at 12; see also O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 6. The U.K. further secured its influence in Persia by
supporting a coup by Reza Khan on February 21, 1921, which resulted in a very strong relationship
between the two States for several years thereafter. ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 12.
63 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 5.
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Shatt al-Arab. In fact, because of the border issue, Persia did not even
recognize the State of Iraq until 1929, at which time Persia still disputed
Iraq's claim to the entire Shatt al-Arabfr4
Shortly after Persia's recognition of Iraq, frictions again emerged
between the two neighbors. In November 1934, Iraq asked the League of
Nations to look into alleged violations of past Ottoman-Persian agree-
ments by Persia.6" Iraq's principle claims were that Persia had erected
security posts in Iraqi territory, that Persia was cutting off water to Iraqi
towns through the construction of dams,66 and that Persia was interfer-
ing in the navigation of the Shatt al-Arab, all in express violation of the
prior agreements.67
Persia responded to the Iraqi claims with a twofold argument.
.First, Persia argued that the agreements, to which Iraq claimed it had
succeeded, were not binding. Persia claimed it had never formally recog-
nized the earlier agreements with the Ottomans, especially the Delimita-
tion Commission of 1914.68 Persia further stated that since it had always
objected to the provisions of the Protocol it was not valid due to the lack
of joint consent, "based on the fact that Britain and Russia, as the domi-
nant imperialist powers in the area at the time, forced their will and in-
terests on the Persian and Ottoman empires .... . 69
Iraq's contention was that the importance of the Shatt al-Arab to
Iraq was so great that principles of equity demanded that it have exclu-
sive right of claim over the entire Shatt al-Arab.70 Persia, on the other
64 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 112.
65 ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 14-15.
66 Although the Shatt al-Arab is formed primarily by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, much of
the water resources that form the Shatt al-Arab come from Iranian rivers such as the Karun, the
upper and lower Zab, the Dialeh and the Kabur. ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 112-13. In particu-
lar, Iraq claimed that a Persian dam across the Gunjan Chain river, which formed approximately 12
miles of the Iraq-Persian border, resulted in a serious depletion of water resources for the Iraqi town
of Zurbatiya. Although both sides seemed to agree that the Delimitation Agreement of 1914 did not
adequately address this issue, the two States did not agree as to what impact the Persian dam had on
Iraqi water resources. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 114, 213-15.
67 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 114; Amin, supra note 13, at 170; KHADDURI,
supra note 5, at 37. The claim that Iran was diminishing the water supply to the Shatt al-Arab was
based on the Constantinople Protocol which allocated water resources to Iraq for irrigation pur-
poses. ABDULGHANI, supra note I, at 112.
68 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 118-21; ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 112. The
Iranian government denied the validity of the Constantinople Protocol because it was based on the
second Treaty of Erzerum, which had recognized Iraqi sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab.
See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Iran claimed that treaty was invalid because its
representative did not have the authority to sign the Explanatory Note that accompanied the treaty.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69 ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 15; see also LEAGUE OF NATIONS supra note 18, at 118-23; Amin,
supra note 13, at 171.
70 Iraq argued that the Shatt al-Arab constituted Iraq's only access to the sea. On the other
hand, Iran had a coast-line of almost 2,000 kilometres, including the deep water port of Khor Musa
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hand, argued that the thalweg principle should be applied to the entire
length of the Shatt al-Arab as dictated by principles of international
law.71 These two arguments have always been central to each side's
claims of how the Shatt al-Arab should be divided between the two
States.
1. The 1937 Treaty
The result of Iraq's complaint to the League of Nations was a re-
newed round of negotiations between Iran and Iraq dealing with their
border disputes.72 In turn, these negotiations led to the creation of a new
Iran-Iraq boundary treaty. The Boundary Treaty between the Kingdom
of Irak and the Empire of Iranv" marked the first major agreement be-
tween the newly established States of Iraq and Iran. The Treaty ex-
pressly sought the definitive settlement of "the question of the frontier
between the two States,"'74 and it even conflrmed the validity of the Con-
stantinople Protocol and the Minutes of the Delimitation Commission of
1914. Unfortunately, like the others before it, the 1937 Treaty did not
last.
The 1937 Treaty, by recognizing the 1913 Protocol, recognized
Iraq's claim of sovereignty to almost the entire Shatt al-Arab. However,
the 1937 Treaty, as the Protocol before it, carved out further exceptions
where the thalweg principle would be used to divide the confluence
around certain key Iranian port cities.76 Furthermore, the Treaty pro-
vided that the two countries would divide any and all dues paid by for-
eign shipping vessels using the Shatt al-Arab,77 that each country's
located just 50 kilometres to the east of the River. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 113.
Iran, however, argued that this should not entitle Iraq to sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab
since there were other States whose only access to the sea was through a single river yet those States
had never been able to legally claim sovereignty over the entire course of the river to the sea. Id. at
120, 122. See also Amin, supra note 13, at 171; see generally ABDULGHANi, supra note 1, at 113-
14.
71 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 18, at 122-23.
72 Iraq withdrew the border dispute from the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations
shortly after the Iraq and Iran settlement was announced in September of 1937. Although it is not
certain what role the League played in the negotiations between Iran and Iraq, it would appear that
the League likely influenced the peaceful settlement through the League's appointed Rapporteur,
Baron Aloisi, of Italy. River Boundaries, supra note 17, at 215.
73 Boundary Treaty Between the Kingdom of Irak and the Empire of Iran, July 4, 1938, Iraq-
Iran, 189 L.N.T.S. 256 (1938) [hereinafter 1937 Treaty].
74 Id.
75 Id. art. l(a) and (b), at 256. The Protocol along with the Commission had reaffirmed Iraqi
sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, with a few exceptions, and introduced the "thalweg" principle
for the first time in Iran-Iraq border treaties. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
76 Id. art. 2, at 256.
77 Id. art. 4(a), at 257.
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vessels of war would have unrestricted passage,78 and that either country
could permit any third party to use the Shatt al-Arab for the passage of
its warships. 7 9
The outbreak of the Second World War, just two years after the
signing of the 1937 Treaty, quickly changed the outlook of the two coun-
tries. Bewteen 1941 and 1946, both countries were occupied by foreign
forces.8 0 When these forces withdrew, they left behind two States with
very unstable governmental structures.8 1 Revolutions in both countries
brought about new calls for the redrawing of the boundary lines.8 2
2. Iraq's Denunciation of the 1937 Treaty
During the late 1950's each side wanted more land and control over
the Shatt al-Arab. 3 Following the 1958 coup d'6tat in Iraq, Iran called
for a redrawing of the border along the Shatt al-Arab using the thalweg
principle.84 Iraq responded by claiming complete sovereignty over the
entire Shatt al-Arab without regard to any of the exceptions in the
Treaty. 5 Iraq did, however, continue to pilot ships into Iranian ports,
but with the assumption that it did so because it controlled the entire
waterway.
6
Iran ignored Iraq's attempts to challenge Iran's free access to the
waterway. 7 In early 1961, Iraq refused to aid any oil tankers in docking
and anchoring in the Iranian refinery of Abadan."8 The economic affects
of this action were so harsh that Iran ceded to the Iraqi terms.8 9 The
Treaty itself, however, was still thought to be in force by both sides until
1969.
78 Id. art. 4(b), at 257.
79 Id. Protocol art. III, at 258.
80 At the beginning of WWII, both Iran and Iraq remained neutral. However, by August of
1941 both States were occupied by Allied forces. Iraq, in April 1941, invited a German Military
Mission to Baghdad but before the Germans arrived, forces from the U.K. landed at Basra and
managed to seize Baghdad themselves where they remained until October 1947. Iran's occupation
by Soviet and U.K. forces began in August of 1941 and lasted until 1946. O'BALLANcE, supra note
4, at 8.
81 KADDURI, supra note 5, at 42.
82 PERSiAN-ARABLAN GULF, supra note 15, at 60-61.
83 Id. at 60-63.
84 ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 18; ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 17.
85 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 45.
86 Amin, supra note 13, at 172-73.
87 Iran, which had previously been paying fees to the Iraqi Port Authority in order to be
piloted along the River, ceased payment of such fees and began using Iran's own pilots to navigate
the Shatt al-Arab. ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 18.
88 This made it virtually impossible for ships to get in and out of Abadan for several weeks.
Amin, supra note 13, at 173.
89 These terms were that Iraq was to be the one who would have exclusive right to control river
traffic, to navigation licenses, and to port duties. PERSIAN-ARABiAN GULF, supra note 15, at 61.
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3. Iran's Abrogation of the 1937 Treaty
Further deterioration of relations between the two States9' finally
resulted in Iran's abrogation of the Treaty on April 19, 1969.91 Iran did
not take long to recover from the affects of the Abadan incident and
began taking control over more and more of the Shatt al-Arab. Using
military escort ships, Iranian tankers navigated the Shatt al-Arab with-
out any aid from Iraqi pilot ships.9 2 This led to Iraqi complaints during
the mid-1960's that the government of Iran was once again violating the
provisions of the 1937 Treaty. Furthermore, Iraq threatened to blockade
the entire Shatt al-Arab if Iran did not cease its alleged violations of the
1937 Treaty. However, the threats and complaints did not stop Iran.
The economic and strategic significance of the Shatt al-Arab was still
high on the list of priorities for both countries. 9
The Iranian denunciation in 1969 resulted in a predictable rise in the
tensions dividing the two countries. In 1971, Iran acted to secure more
control over the Persian Gulf by occupying three strategically located
islands in the waterway. 94 In response, Iraq broke off diplomatic ties
with Iran. 95 The two countries continued to aggravate each other both in
the Shatt al-Arab and in the area to the north were the Kurds were lo-
cated. The Kurdish population, which wanted an independent state,96
had its greatest concentration in Iraq. The religious and philosophical
differences separating the Arabs and the Kurds97 in Iraq made it impossi-
ble for the two cultures to happily coexist. These differences were further
90 In July of 1968, a coup by the Ba'th Party in Iraq served to hinder relations between the two
States. Id.
91 The Iranian government based its abrogation on the fact that no treaty could be based on a
principle other than one encompassing the median base line (thalweg) and therefore the 1937 Treaty
was null and void. ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 19.
92 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 51.
93 PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 62-63.
94 The islands of Abu Musa, which was administered by Shajah, Greater Tumb and Lesser
Tumb, which were previously controlled by Ras el-Khaimah, were occupied by Iran on November 4,
1971. O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 10; ISMAEL, supra note 38, at 20.
95 Amin, supra note 13, at 175.
96 The Treaty of S6vres of 1920 actually contained provisions for a Kurdish independent state.
But when none was formed immediately following the Treaty's creation, the Kurds seemed to have
lost their best hope for independence for, in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed without any
reference to the Kurds. O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 5. The Kurds, however, did have their hopes
revived by an agreement dated March 11, 1970, between the ruling Ba'thist Party of Iraq and the
Kurds, which "promised that the Kurds would be granted self-rule .... The agreement's promises
did not materialize due to strife within the Kurdish leadership. KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 53.
97 The Kurds make up approximately 19% of the Iraqi population and, although they share
the same religion as the Iraqi government, (Sunni Muslim), they are a distinct people with their own
language and identity. The Kurds live almost exclusively in northern Iraq and have been at odds
with the Iraqi government about the possibility of their own home land for almost fifty years. IRAQ;
A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 5, at 82-84.
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antagonized by Iran which continually supported Kurdish moves for in-
dependence in Iraq.98
Iran and Iraq managed to reestablish diplomatic ties in 1973 for the
purpose of renegotiating their boundary dispute. But before they could
conduct any meaningful negotiations, hostilities broke out in 1974.91
The hostilities were concentrated along the northern border and the
Kurds were at the heart of the conflict."c° The Kurds, demanding that
they be granted their right to self-government, began to protest vehe-
mently. In reaction, the Iraqi government used military force not only to
quell the protests but to also drive the Kurds out of Iraq. Iran responded
by coming to the aid of the Kurds and even came into direct conflict with
Iraqi troops.' 0 '
Iraq protested to the U.N. Security Council that the Iranians had
violated the territorial integrity of Iraq. Iran responded by pointing out
that Iraq had started the fighting by shelling Iranian frontier posts.'02
However, the fighting did not last long. Neither side was able to get the
quick victory it was looking for 0 3 and, therefore, U.N. mediation efforts
managed to arrange a temporary cease fire in March 1974.11 This cease
fire was tenuous, and further border clashes broke out in August 1974.
These clashes continued sporadically until January 1975.105
During the fighting of 1974, Iraq and Iran did manage to meet in
talks aimed at the creation of a new treaty that could reestablish the
border between the two states. These talks were aided by a convergence
of various factors. For Iran's part, it sought to limit the influence of the
Soviet Union in the Middle East. At the same time, Iran became more
willing to put pressure on Israel"°6 (an Iraqi objective) in order to
strengthen the leverage of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)."0 7 Iraq also wanted to see a more strongly united
OPEC. To that end it sought to break out of its self-imposed exile from
the Arab world while letting its ties with the USSR wane. 08 Thus, dur-
98 Id. at 54-56.
99 Amin, supra note 13, at 176.
100 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 55-56.
101 Amin, supra note 13, at 176.
102 Id.
103 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 56.
104 Amin, supra note 13, at 176.
105 Id.
106 Iran and Israel had become strategic allies in the Middle East, despite their ideological
differences, following the defection of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact in 1959. The Baghdad Pact was
originally formed in February 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, the U.K., Pakistan, and Iran as a way to
counter the "common perceptions and fears of potential Soviet threats" in the Middle East.
ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 13, 16.
107 Id. at 157.
108 Id.
1992]
CASE W. RES: J. INT'L L4
ing the OPEC meetings in Algiers in March, 1975, the two sides reached
a significant reconciliation referred to as the Algiers Agreement of March
6, 1975.1°9
4. The Algiers Agreement
The Algiers Agreement (hereinafter Agreement) provided that the
two sides agreed to:
1) Carry out a final delineation of their land boundaries in accord-
ance with the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the Proceed-
ings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914.
2) Demarcate their river boundaries according to the thalweg line.
3) Restore security and mutual confidence along their joint
borders....
4) Consider the aforesaid arrangements as inseparable elements of a
comprehensive solution. Consequently, any infringement of one
of its components shall naturally contradict the spirit of the Al-
giers Accord .... 1
The first two of these provisions are the most significant for they estab-
lish the basis for the Iran-Iraq border. Iran agreed to abide by the 1913
Protocol in establishing the land boundary, which detailed the border
between Iran and Iraq north of the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq finally conceded
to Iran's long standing demand that the thalweg principle be used to
delimit the border in the Shatt al-Arab.
5. The Treaty of 1975
Immediately following the Agreement, Iran and Iraq resumed in-
tense negotiations to further specify the details laid out in the Agree-
ment. These negotiations concluded with the signing of the Treaty
Concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran
and Iraq111 signed on June 13, 1975. The Treaty affirmed the principles
of the Algiers Accord while at the same time Iran implicitly agreed to
end its support of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.112 The Treaty also con-
tained two extremely important articles. Article 4 provided that in the
event that any of the first three articles were breached, the Treaty as a
whole would be considered breached. Article 6 provided for specific
measures to be taken in the event that there was a dispute either to the
interpretation or implementation of the Treaty. These key articles will
be further expounded on later in the determination of the validity of
109 Id. at 152.
110 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 199.
111 Treaty Concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq,
June 13, 1975, Iran-Iraq, 1017 U.N.T.S. 136 [hereinafter 1975 Treaty].
112 Id. at art. 3, 137.
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Iraq's denunciation of the Treaty in 1980.113
The 1975 Treaty "was ratified by both States and its implementation
went ahead with considerable smoothness."' 14 Between 1975 and 1979,
Iran and Iraq met frequently with great success, including the signing of
six bilateral agreements in July of 1977."1 One of the most significant of
these agreements was the determination to answer the boundary question
and to order troops to withdraw a distance of one kilometer from the
border. 16
6. Abrogation of the 1975 Treaty by Iraq
The revolution in Iran along with the rise to power in Iraq of Sad-
dam Hussein marked the start of a rapid deterioration in relations be-
tween the two States. In February 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini came
to power following the overthrow of the Shah's Government in Iran." 7
Khomeini had lived in Iraq until 1978 when he was expelled from the
country as Iraq and Iran improved relations."' With Khomeini's rise to
power, new tensions became inevitable.
Despite Iraq's previous expulsion of the new Iranian leader, Iraq
sent a telegram of congratulations to the Ayatollah on February 13,
1979. 1 This telegram, along with later follow-up cables and diplomatic
overtures, was meant to convey Iraq's wishes to continue the recent im-
provement in friendly relations between the two countries.' 20 Iran, how-
ever, largely ignored the diplomatic gestures sent by Iraq.' 2 ' As the year
pressed on, Iraq grew more concerned about the ability of the Ayatollah
to control the Iranian people. Its frequent cables asked Iran to make
certain that it abided by the provisions of the Treaty of 1975. A further
lack of response on the part of Iran brought out the extremist factions on
both sides of the border. 22
The Iranian silence in response to the Iraqi cables and the new Ira-
nian doctrine of exporting its Islamic revolution to its neighbors made
113 See infra notes 185, 187 and accompanying text.
114 Amin, supra note 13, at 178.
115 These bilateral agreements, a result of the new period of "entente" in Iran-Iraq relations
following the signing of the 1975 Treaty, dealt with "trade and cultural relations; freedom of move-
ment by Iranians in visiting Shi'it holy places in Iraq; agriculture and fishing; railway systems link-
ages; and co-ordination of activities concerning the movement of 'subversive elements." Id.
116 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 160.
117 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 80.
118 Even before Iran and Iraq became friendlier, the presence of the Ayatollah in Iraq was not
particularly welcomed. Khomeini's lectures on Islamic government did not coincide with the ruling
Ba'thist party ideology in Iraq. Id. at 79.
119 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 182.
120 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 81.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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Iraq very fearful that Iran did not intend to honor its Treaty obliga-
tions.123 Once Iraq realized that Iran did not want to continue the previ-
ous friendly relations, Iraq felt that it was in a position to demand a
revision of the 1975 Treaty even though Iran had not yet breached any
article of the Treaty. This was mainly due to Iraq's belief that the
revolution in Iran had so disintegrated the Iranian army that Iran would
be unable to adequately defend itself.'24 Iraq hoped that it could recover
some of the territory of the Shatt al-Arab that it had ceded to Iran.'25
This hope turned into a threefold demand by Iraq on Iran. The first was
to abrogate the 1975 Algiers Treaty and restore Iraqi rights over the
Shatt al-Arab; the second was to evacuate the Three Islands (in the Per-
sian Gulf); and the third was to grant full autonomy to both Iranian
Kurds and the Arabs in Khuzistan Province. 26 These demands were
rejected outright by Iran. 27 Tensions on the border started to flare.
In 1980, violations of territorial sovereignty were alleged by both
countries in growing numbers.' 2 Finally, on September 4, 1980, Iranian
troops located in unreturned Iraqi frontier towns129 began shelling sev-
eral villages located in Iraqi territory. 130 For Iran, this marked the offi-
cial start of the Iran-Iraq war."'
Iraq did not hesitate in condemning the Iranian action, indicating
that it would not stand idly by while Iran committed such illegal acts.' 32
On September 7, 1980, Iraq forcibly reclaimed the area of Zain al-Qaws,
territory that was to have been returned to Iraq following the 1975
Treaty.1 33 The following day, Iraq demanded that the rest of the unre-
turned territories be given back without further delay.134 On September
11, 1980, Iraq reiterated its position that Iran cease hostilities and return
123 Id. at 82.
124 Amin, supra note 13, at 179.
125 This was territory that Iraq had parted with when it signed the 1975 Treaty with Iran. Iraq
later felt that it been given up this territory under duress and therefore demanded the return of the
territory's in question by Iran to Iraq. PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 70-71.
126 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 11.
127 Id.
128 Iraq claimed, among other things, that Iran repeatedly violated Iraqi airspace and that Iran
had instigated two separate terrorist bombings in Baghdad in April 1980. KEADDURI, supra note 5,
at 83; O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at 11.
129 The towns were supposed to have been returned to Iraq in accordance with the Algiers
Agreement of 1975. KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 83.
130 Id.
131 O'BALLANCE, supra note 4, at xii.
132 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 83-84.
133 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 201. Although the 1975 Treaty had not laid down a precise
time table for the returning of these areas, most of the land frontier marks should have been estab-
lished within one year from May 20, 1975. Protocol Concerning the Redemarcation of the Land
Frontier Between Iran and Iraq, June 13, 1975, Iran-Iraq, art. 1(c), 1017 U.N.T.S. 136, 141.
134 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 83.
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Iraq's territory."' 5 Iran choose to simply ignore these cables.13 6
Finally, on September 17, 1980, Iraq declared the 1975 Treaty abro-
gated. Iraq claimed that Iran's frequent and blatant violations of the
accord necessitated the Iraqi announcement.117 In abrogating the 1975
Treaty, Iraq stated that its sovereign rights to the entire Shatt al-Arab
should be reestablished as they had existed before the Treaty. 3 In re-
sponse, Iran sent a letter to the United Nations which denounced and
rejected the Iraqi unilateral abrogation of the Treaty. 39 On September
22, 1980 at 2:00 p.m. Iranian time,"4 Iraq launched a full scale assault
on Iran along the entire length of the border between the two countries.
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATY PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
Historically, relations between Iran and Iraq have never been amica-
ble. Their history, however, does provide a unique opportunity to study
the legal principles of treaty creation, implementation, interpretation,
and termination. 4' This section examines these issues in determining
what the legal status of the 1937 and 1975 Treaties was when war broke
out in 1980.
B. The Abrogation of the 1937 Treaty
On April 19, 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 Treaty.142 The Iranians
argued that there existed three different grounds by which it could legally
135 Id. at 84.
136 Id. at 81.
137 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 202.
138 PERSIAN-ARABIAN GULF, supra note 15, at 71.
139 KKADDURI, supra note 5, at 86.
140 See supra note 1.
141 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will be used as the reference point in ana-
lyzing the legal claims of Iran and Iraq concerning the Treaties of 1937 and 1975. Although it was
not officially ratified until 1981, the Law of Treaties has been recognized as the primary source of
international law regarding treaties between countries. IAN M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1-21 (1973). Furthermore, it should be noted that Iran became a
signatory to the Convention on May 23, 1969, although Iraq has not yet become a signatory. Law
of Treaties, supra note 3, at 679.
The Law of Treaties is designed to be a comprehensive codification of customary custom and
practice as defined throughout the centuries. Article 2(a) of the Treaty defines "'treaty' [as] an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation." Id. at 681. In short, therefore, "treaty" is meant to cover all written agree-
ments between States. The rest of the articles of the Law of Treaties will be examined in relation to
their applicability to the Iran-Iraq treaty series.
142 See supra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
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abrogate the Treaty. 143 The first was that it was the Iraqi government
which had first breached the 1937 Treaty. Iran claimed that terms laid
out in articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty, along with clause 2 of the attached
protocol, had never been fulfilled by Iraq, thus causing the Treaty to be
materially breached. 1" The Law of Treaties defines a material breach as
consisting of "(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the pres-
ent Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accom-
plishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." 141
To this end, Iran noted that the asserted Convention provided for in
article 5146 of the 1937 Treaty had never been established. The Conven-
tion was to deal with all questions relating to the navigation of the Shatt
al-Arab. 47 Clause 2 of the protocol attached to the Treaty further stated
that the Convention was to be concluded within one year after the sign-
ing of the Treaty.148 The Convention was never adopted due to a disa-
greement over how the river should be managed. Iran asserted that such
management should be done equally by the two countries, while Iraq
claimed exclusive right of control over the Shatt al-Arab's
management. 149
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states "[a] treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."' 50 Thus, the Iranian argument is not without merit. The over-
all object of the 1937 Treaty was to reaffirm Iraq's sovereignty to the
whole Shatt al-Arab.' 51 At the same time, however, the Treaty also
sought to affirm the "common interest" shared by both countries in being
able to freely navigate the Shatt al-Arab, including the passage of "ves-
sels of war," as well as in the collection of dues for the "exclusive" pur-
143 Iranian Statement Concerning Abrogation of 1937 Treaty Between Iraq and Iran, 8 I.L.M.
481, 481-83 [hereinafter Iranian Statement]; see also Amin, supra note 13, at 174 (analyzing the
grounds for abrogation).
144 Iranian Statement, supra note 143, at 482-83.
145 Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 60(3) at 701.
146 Article 5 states that the parties "undertake to conclude a Convention for the maintenance
and improvement of the navigable channel... and [for] all other questions concerning navigation in
the Shatt 6l-Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present Treaty." 1937 Treaty, supra note 73, at art. 5,
at 257.
147 Id.
148 Id. cl. 2.
149 Amin, supra note 13, at 172.
150 Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 31 at 693. It should also be noted that "Articles 31 to 33
of the Convention have been said by the European Court of Human Rights ... to 'enunciate in
essence generally accepted principles of international law. .. .' Accordingly, there is now strong
judicial support for the view that the rules of treaty interpretation incorporated in the Convention
are declaratory of customary international law." SINCLAIR, supra note 141, at 19.
151 1937 Treaty, supra note 73, art. 1, at 256.
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pose of maintaining the Shatt al-Arab.15 2 The Convention was to be
aimed at seeing the specific details of the "common interest" more fully
elaborated. Although the Convention never came to fruition, it would
appear in light of the 'object and purpose' of the 1937 Treaty that Iran
and Iraq should share equally in the maintenance of the Shatt al-Arab.
This, however, never seemed to be the case.
Iran accused Iraq of using the dues collected "to build several hotels
and an airport at Basra."' 113 Further, it charged that Iraq had "con-
ducted the affairs of the Shat-ul-Arab [sic] in a unilateral manner illegally
keeping the administration under its own control." ' 4 These charges, if
accurate, would constitute a breach of the 1937 Treaty, for Iraq would
have clearly contravened the intent of the Treaty to encourage joint par-
ticipation in the administration of the Shatt al-Arab.
Iraq's response did not deny these charges. Instead, the Iraqi gov-
ernment pointed to Iranian breaches of the 1937 Treaty. Iraq's main
contention was that Iranian troops massed on the border had "actually
been used in violating Iraqi sovereignty in Shatt al-Arab .... ,15 5 Iraq's
basic argument was that since the 1937 Treaty had confirmed Iraqi sov-
ereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab, it was the exclusive province of
Iraq to administer the area. 5 6 This "principle of international law," as
referred to by Iraq,5 7 allows for joint administration of areas under the
exclusive jurisdiction of one country as may be agreed upon by express
agreement between two States. In this case, there was a non-self-execut-
ing agreement that such joint administration should take place. 58  Be-
cause the actual Convention designed to give Iran the power of joint
administration was never convened, Iran never received actual authority
to have joint powers of administration.1 9 Thus, Iran's argument that
Iraq had materially breached the 1937 Treaty does not appear valid.
152 Id. art. 4 and art. 5, at 257.
153 Iranian Letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, 8 I.L.M. 489, 490 (1969)
[hereinafter Iranian Letter]. According to article 4 of the 1937 Treaty, supra note 73, art. 4, at 257,
the dues were to be "devoted exclusively to meeting in [an] equitable manner the cost of upkeep,
maintenance of navigability or improvement of the navigable channel and the approach to the Shatt
61-Arab from the sea, or to the expenditure incurred in the interests of navigation."
154 Iranian Statement, supra note 143, at 482.
155 Iraqi Letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, 8 I.L.M. 487, 487 (1969) [herein-
after Iraqi Letter].
156 Id. at 487.
157 Id. at 487.
158 A non-self-executing agreement is one where two States agree to agree upon something on a
future date. In the 1937 Treaty, this agreement was that Iran and Iraq would "undertake to con-
clude a Convention for the maintenance and improvement of the navigable channel, and for dredg-
ing, pilotage, collection of dues, health measures, measures for preventing smuggling, and all other
questions concerning navigation in the Shatt-el-Arab .... 1937 Treaty, supra note 73, art. 5, at
257.
159 The Protocol attached to the 1937 Treaty stated:
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The second basis for Iran's abrogation was based on the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus.1 The Law of Treaties states that a "fundamental
change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating
or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a bound-
ary .... "16 The 1937 Treaty clearly falls under this rubric, thus extin-
guishing Iran's use of the doctrine.
Iran, however, tried to invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus to
argue further that the 1937 Treaty was invalid because of lack of con-
sent. 62 Iran claimed that the overwhelming influence of the U.K.'s pres-
ence in the Shatt al-Arab163 and its close alliance with Iraq had made it
impossible for Iran to have freely consented to the 1937 Treaty." Iran
The High Contracting Parties undertake to conclude the Convention to which Article
5 of the Treaty relates within one year from the entry into force of the Treaty.
In the event of the said Convention not being concluded within the year despite their
utmost efforts, the said time-limit may be extended by the High Contracting Parties by
common accord.
The Imperial Government of Iran agrees that, during the period of one year to which
the first paragraph of the present Article relates or the extension (if any) of such period, the
Royal Government of Iraq shall be responsible as at present for all questions to be settled
under the said Convention. The Royal Government of Iraq shall notify the Imperial Gov-
ernment of Iran every six months as to the works executed, dues collected, expenditure
incurred or any other measures undertaken.
Id. Protocol art. II, at 258. This Protocol makes it clear that in the absence of a Convention estab-
lishing the rights and duties of both States, it would be up to Iraq to settle all issues concerning the
administration of the Shatt al-Arab. Since no such Convention was ever concluded it would follow
that Iraq retains the exclusive right to administer the river, with the small duty of keeping Iran
informed about the dues being collected and spent.
160 In drawing up the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission stated the doctrine
of rebus sic stantibus could not be used to terminate a treaty unless two conditions were met: "a) The
existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be
bound by the treaty; and b) The effect of the change was radically to transform the extent of obliga-
tions still to be performed under the treaty." SINCLAIR, supra note 141, at 106; see Law of Treaties,
supra note 3, art. 62(1)(a)-(b), at 702. Along these lines, Iran claimed that the treaty had been
signed at the height of British colonial power in the region. Consequently, the end of that system
brought about the fundamental change necessary to invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Ira-
nian Statement, supra note 143, at 483.
161 Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 62(2)(a), at 702; see also SINCLAIR, supra note 141, at
47.
162 The doctrines of rebus sic stantibus and lack of consent are generally two very separate
principles of international law. This is seen in the fact that the doctrine of coercion-lack of con-
sent-is found at Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 52, at 698, while rebus sic stantibus is found at
Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 62, at 702. Iran, however, seems to have combined these two very
different principles of international law in order to try and put forth an argument that is not solidly
based on any individual principle of international law.
163 In 1937, Britain actually accounted for over 90 percent of the shipping in the Shatt al-Arab,
while over 80 percent of the port traffic in the Abadan harbor was needed for British owned oil.
Anin, supra note 13, at 174.
164 Iranian Statement, supra note 143, at 483-84. Iran reenforced this argument by stating
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clearly sought to establish the fact that the failure of the Treaty to follow
the thalweg principle was a direct indication of Iran's inability to have
freely negotiated the terms of the 1937 Treaty.
However, there are two weaknesses in Iran's argument. First,
although Article 11 of the Law of Treaties does list the various means by
which a State may consent to a treaty,'65 there also exists the principle of
international custom and practice. The State of Iraq and its predeces-
sor166 had always claimed and exercised complete sovereignty over the
Shatt al-Arab. Iran, furthermore, acknowledged Iraq's rights over the
Shatt al-Arab through its recognition of the 1913 Protocol, which was
reaffirmed in the 1975 Treaty.167 By negotiating for the right of free pas-
sage through the Shatt al-Arab, Iran clearly realized Iraq's historic claim
to sovereignty over the entire River. 6 '
Secondly, one must note that to divide the Shatt al-Arab equally
between the two States using the thalweg principle is difficult. The
thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab does not approximate the median line of the
river. Instead, the thalweg crosses from one bank to another in a con-
stant yet inconsistent manner.'69 The winding thalweg made it clear that
the Shatt al-Arab's border could not be based on conventional interna-
tional principles but must be adapted to the unique environment of the
Shatt al-Arab.
In conclusion, the abrogation of the 1937 Treaty by Iran does not
appear to have met the standards of international law in allowing the
general termination of treaties. This finds support in that Iraq and Iran
had also signed a treaty designed to establish a framework in which all
future disputes could be resolved. 7 This Treaty expressly provided for
the diplomatic settlement of all disputes, either directly or through sub-
mission to either an Arbitral Tribunal or to the Permanent Court of In-
In the entire world no similar case can be found when a river as large and as navigable as
the Shat-ul-Arab [sic] which is the common frontier between the two countries, is con-
trolled by one of the two parties alone.
It is impossible to conceive that a frontier river which draws most of its waters from Ira-
nian sources should belong to another government.
Id. at 484.
165 Namely by "signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, accept-
ance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed." Law of Treaties, supra note 3, at
art. I1.
166 See supra notes 23-55, and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
168 1937 Treaty, supra note 73, art. 4(a), at 257.
169 Amin, supra note 13, at 174.
170 The Treaty specifically states: "[tihe High Contracting Parties undertake to submit for
peaceful settlement, in the manner provided in the present Treaty, any dispute arising between them
which is not possible to settle by the ordinary method of diplomatic negotiation." Treaty for the
Pacific Settlement of Disputes between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Empire of Iran, July 24, 1937,
Iraq-Iran art. I, 4425 L.N.T.S. 271, 271. [hereinafter Settlement Treaty].
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ternational Justice."'1 Iran's unilateral abrogation of the 1937 Treaty
clearly violated the object and purpose of this Settlement Treaty, which
was to arrive at a peaceful resolution of all disputes instead of acting in a
manner that would so clearly hinder relations.
C Abrogation of the 1975 Treaty
On September 17, 1980, the Iraqi government officially abrogated
the 1975 Treaty. 72 The Iraqi government claimed among other things
that: (1) Iran had materially breached the accord; (2) Iran's breach ena-
bled Iraq to invoke Article 4 allowing Iraq to declare the Treaty null and
void; (3) in the alternative, Iraq never gave or had the requisite consent
when the 1975 Treaty was signed.17 3
Iraq claimed that when it agreed to give up its claim over the entire
Shatt al-Arab and instead allowed, for the first time ever, the thalweg
principle to be used along the entire length of the Shat al-Arab, it clearly
did so because it was internally weak. 74 The reason for Iraq being in
such a precarious state was due to its exhaustive efforts in trying to quell
the Kurdish uprising of the early 1970s. The Kurdish rebels managed to
have a significant impact on Iraq because of the large, direct aid from
Iran. Iranian armed forces went so far as to actually operate within Iraqi
Kurdistan in supporting the Kurds.17 Iraq's only viable solution was to
negotiate a treaty with the State which was directly responsible for Iraq's
weakened condition.
Physical coercion, through the use of one's military, may be prohib-
ited by the Law of Treaties in Article 52.176 The interpretations of this
Article indicate that the use of force provision is limited to threats or use
of physical force, not economic or political force.1 77 Iran not only heav-
ily supplied the Kurds with weapons in fighting Iraq but Iran also "oper-
ated inside Iraqi Kurdistan in support of the Kurdish rebels in the latter
171 Id. arts. 1 and 2.
172 See supra notes 117-140, and accompanying text.
173 ABDULGHANI, supra note 1, at 202-04.
174 Amin, supra note 13, at 178-79.
175 Id.
176 Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 52, at 698: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations." The U.N. Charter does not clarify or add to what is meant by
threat or use of force, stating that, "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
However, in drafting Article 52, participating States vigorously contended that "force" as used in
Article 2(4) of the Charter was meant to cover only physical or armed force. SINCLMR, supra note
141, at 97.
177 SINCLAIR, supra note 141, at 98-99.
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stages of the rebelion."' 178 Thus, even though, when Article 52 was
drafted most commentator's called for strict interpretation, 179 Iran's in-
volvement clearly tests the bounds of Article 52.180
This does not mean, however, that Iraq may have found a legal basis
for its abrogation of the 1975 Treaty. There is the fact that Iraq refused
to accept this same argument when Iran sought to invoke coercion as a
basis for its abrogation of the 1937 Treaty.' 8 ' Thus, by not allowing Iran
to use the coercion argument when the U.K. so clearly dominated the
area, making it virtually impossible for Iran to get an equitable agree-
ment, Iraq set precedence which acts to bind it from being able to claim
it was not acting of free will when it signed the 1975 Treaty.
Iraq had not brought up the issue of nonconsent until it claimed that
the Treaty was abrogated. Following the downfall of the Shah and the
resulting turmoil in Iran, Iraq, knowing that it was suddenly in a supe-
rior negotiating position, did not claim that it had been coerced until it
announced the abrogation. This clearly shows Iraq's intent to justify its
actions based on principles which Iraq itself had earlier argued against
when set forth by Iran. The sanctity which treaties are given in interna-
tional law, as confirmed in the preamble clauses to the Law of Trea-
ties, 8 2 does not and cannot allow for such arbitrary arguments to
succeed in justifying unilateral declarations.
The first two arguments by Iraq involve the interpretation of the
1975 Treaty. The Law of Treaties instructs parties to interpret treaties
with regard to their ordinary meaning in light of their overall purpose
and objective. In examining the Iraqi interpretation, it is necessary to see
exactly what Articles 4 and 6 of the 1975 Treaty state.
Article 4. The... Parties confirm that the provisions of the three
Protocols... referred to in articles 1, 2, and 3183 above... as an
178 Amin, supra note 13, at 179.
179 SINCLAIR, supra note 141, at 97-99.
180 Iraq's argument becomes even stronger when one takes note that the States involved in the
drafting of the Law of Treaties, although completely agreeing on exactly what "the use of force"
fully entailed, did manage to unanimously adopt "a declaration condemning the threat or use of
pressure in any form by a State to coerce any other State to conclude a treaty." Id. at 99.
181 PERsIAN-ARABIAN GuLF, supra note 15, at 65.
182 Law of Treaties, supra note 3, at 680.
183 The first three articles of the 1975 Treaty state:
Article 1. The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State land frontier in the Shatt
al'Arab between Iraq and Iran shall be that which has been redemarcated on the basis of
and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning redemarcation of the
land frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this Treaty.
Article 2. The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State frontier shall be that which
has been delimited on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol
concerning the delimitation of the river frontier ....
Article 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise strict and effective perma-
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integral part thereof shall be final and permanent. They shall not be
infringed under any circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible
elements of an over-all settlement. Accordingly, a breach of any of the
components of this over-all settlement shall clearly be incompatible
with the spirit of the Algiers Agreement.
Article 6. 1. In the event of a dispute regarding the interpretation or
implementation of this Treaty .... any solution to such a dispute shall
strictly respect the course of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier referred to in
articles 1 and 2 above and shall take into account the need to maintain
security on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in accordance with article 3
above.
2. Such disputes shall be resolved in the first instance by... direct
bilateral negotiations ... [or through] the good offices of a friendly
third State... [or] by arbitration .... ."4
Iraq's claim was that, since Iran had violated Article 3 of the 1975
Treaty by supporting renewed attacks on Iraqi frontier towns as well as
terrorist bombings in Baghdad, then Article 4 came into force, com-
pletely invalidating the 1975 Treaty."8 ' Iraq claimed the "application of
Article 6 pre-supposes the existence of the Treaty through the non-viola-
tion of any of its indivisible elements." 18 6 Thus, Iraq's assertion was that
for Article 6 to be applicable, the Treaty must first still remain valid
under Article 4.
Even though the Treaty provides an express means to resolve dis-
putes concerning treaty implementation and interpretation, Iraq still ar-
gues that it first has the power to interpret the Treaty to ascertain
whether or not Article 6 may be invoked at all. This logic enables Iraq
effectively to defeat the entire purpose and existence of Article 6.
Clearly, the purpose behind the insertion of Article 6 was to avoid ex-
actly the type of behavior Iraq engaged in since the two States were try-
nent control over the frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive
nature from any source, on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Proto-
col concerning frontier security ....
1975 Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 1-3, at 136-37.
184 1975 Treaty, supra note Ill, at art. 4 and art. 6, at 137.
185 In an address to the United Nations Security Council, Foreign Minister Saadun Hamadi of
Iraq stated:
The Algiers Agreement represented a package deal, Mr. President, the spirit of which was
to arrive at a final and terminal solution to the existing problems between the two countries
in application of the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and nonin-
terference in internal affairs.
When article four is violated, this means that the whole treaty becomes nonexistent. Any
argument to the contrary makes the provisions of these two articles contradictory and
impossible to apply.
The continuous violations of the elements of the treaty mentioned in article four left Iraq
with no treaty to implement.
Excerpts from Iranian, Iraqi and US. Addresses at UN. Council, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 18, 1980, at 4.
186 KHADDURI, supra note 5, at 86.
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ing to avoid conflict and build more neighbourly relations when they
concluded their agreement. The preamble to the Treaty confirms this
interpretation. 117
The best and most realistic reading of Articles 4 and 6 together
would be as follows. Article 6 will be invoked any time there is a dispute
concerning any part of the Treaty. If the dispute revolves around the
interpretation or implementation of any of the first three articles, then
there must be adherence to the specific objectives of those individual
articles. In the event that the resolution of Article 6 is a finding that a
violation of one of the first three articles has taken place, then article 4
will be invoked, rendering the Treaty null and void if the violated party
so chooses. This interpretation seems best suited to the purposes and
objectives of all the clauses and articles of the 1975 Treaty taken as a
whole. Thus, the Iraqi denunciation of the 1975 Treaty proves to be no
more justifiable than that of Iran eleven years earlier.
IV. CONCLUSION
The treaties that have marked the development of relations between
Iran and Iraq provide a unique opportunity to reexamine some of the
fundamental international principles regarding treaty law. As can be
seen, States will go to great ends to justify their claims that their actions
are always, in some way, justifiable despite what might be appear to be
the clear intentions of a given treaty. Iran, and later Iraq, both at-
tempted to construe facts and principles to meet their final goals of gain-
ing control of the Shatt al-Arab and claiming as much territory in the
Kurdish region as possible. In the end, their unilateral terminations of
the treaties were not justified. Although one could say that Iraq's blatant
use of military force to back its claim is a more severe violation of inter-
national law,188 neither country comes out unscathed. It appears that
the two States have an equal claim to the Shatt al-Arab based on the
thalweg principle and the basis of the 1975 Treaty should be the estab-
lished border along the entire frontier until a new agreement is drawn.
189
Joseph J Cusimano *
187 Article 31(2) states that the text of any treaty shall "includ[e] its preamble." Law of Trea-
ties, supra note 3, art 31(2), at 692.
188 See Amin, supra note 13, at 181.
189 This conclusion appears to be the direction in which the two States are presently headed.
On August 17, 1990, the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, announced his acceptance of the Ira-
nian terms for a peace treaty. Those terms would basically reestablish the 1975 Treaty between Iran
and Iraq, giving Iran sovereignty over roughly half the Shatt al-Arab and returning approximately
1,000 square miles of land to Iran. Claude Van England, Iran Jubilant Over Iraq's Proposal but
Won't Alter Policy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 17, 1990, at 1; Nick Williams Jr., Iraq Bids For
Peace with Iran, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
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